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EVIDENCE: CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN A CIVIL TRIAL.
The question frequently arises as to when and under what
circumstances a person's character is adissible in evidence in
the course of a trial. The type of character evidence permissible
must, of course, concern the party's general reputation in the com-
munity in which he lives, as specific instances of conduct are not
allowed because of the consequent entailment of collateral matters
and confusion of the issues.'
Unlike criminal trials where reputation may play perhaps a
major role in deciding the guilt or innocence of the accused, such
evidence is generally excluded in civil cases- because the personality
cf a party is of little assistance in deciding the real issues. Wigmore
gives as reasons for its non-admission the lack of probative value
and the consequent creation of undue prejudice, unfair surprise, and
utter confusion in the minds of the jury.' It was stated as early as
1791 in a civil trial that the case, not the man, is in issue, and that
"a very bad man may have a very righteous cause."' Such evidence
was excluded in a recent Michigan case in which an action was
brought for the specific performance of an oral contract to convey
land, wherein the court said: "Much time was wasted to show
Rozell A. Gardner's bad personal habits, and character, none of
which has any material bearing on the issues in the case."'3 Whether
or not in an action on a contract a party to the suit was stigmatized
with a bad reputation would shed no light on the transaction in
.question. Instead it would place him in a very unfavorable position
in the eyes of the jury who would more than likely concentrate on
his previous bad conduct to the exclusion of the real merits of the
case. It might also result in a parade of witnesses testifying to the
good or bad reputation of the party involved, leaving the jury in a
quandary as to the purpose for which the trial was called. Reasons
advanced for its exclusion in an early Vermont decision were that
it would " make trials intolerably long and tedious and greatly
increase the expense and delay of litigation. It is a kind of evidence
that might be easily manufactured and if in common use in the courts
as likely to mislead as to guide aright."14 Still another factor for its
'Tingle v Worthington, 215 Ala. 126, 110 So. 143 (1926), Clark
v Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 254 Mass. 441, 150 N.E. 184 (1926) Hager
v. Hager, 17 Tenn. App. 143, 66 S.W 2d 250, 255 (1934) Tarwater v.
Donley County State Bank, -Texas Civ. App.- 277 S.W 176, 178-
179 (1926).
Sharp v. Clapton, 218 Ala. 140, 117 So. 647, 648 (1928) Seybold
v. Pierce, 171 Okla. 112, 44 P 2d 826, 827 (1935)
'I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) sec. 64.
'Thompson v. Church, 1 Root (Conn.) -312 (1791)
'Gardner v. Gardner, 311 Mich. 615, 19 N.W 2d 118, 121 (1945).
'Wright v. McKee, 37 Vt. 161 (1864).
KCENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
exclusion is the view that it is merely an opinion, and because of its
consequent untrustworthiness, should be admitted only as a last
resort.
Although this type of evidence is as a general rule not admitted,
civil cases occur where it may be allowed. Virtually all states permit
it if the character of the party is put in issue.7 Actions of this kind
include seduction, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and similar
cases in which character may be the very issue determining the
.right and the extent of recovery.'
An extension has been made by Georgia as to when character
is put in issue. The Georgia Code provides that "The general char-
acter of the parties, and especially their conduct in other transac-
tions, are irrelevant matter, unless the nature of the action involves
such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of
such conduct."9 Subsequent Georgia cases have allowed the mtro-
duction of general reputation where the party is charged with fraud
or moral turpitude. Thus in an alimony action the court in that state
held that the plaintiff's character was put in issue when the de-
fendant testified that she had threatened to go out and act as a
streetwalker and that if she had a baby she would name it after the
defendant." Generally however, the imputation of either fraud or
moral turpitude will not place the character of the parties In issue,
and so hold the better reasoned cases. 1
Another category of civil cases where character evidence is
sometimes permitted involves assault and battery. Here again there
is a general breakdown and conflict as to when such matter is ad-
missible. Where a general denial is entered as a defense, the reputa-
tion of the parties is everywhere excluded; but where self defense
is pleaded or there is a question as to the aggressor, a further prob-
lem is posed.
Most states, refuse to allow evidence of the defendant's character
for peace and quiet, even though self defense is pleaded,' on the
ground that having admitted the assault, the defendant's reputation
is "irrelevant, immaterial, and no wise in issue."' Evidence that
Browning v Browning, 226 Mo. App. 322, 41 S.W 2d 860, 867
(1931), Keyes v. Keyes, 27 N.M. 215, 199 Pac. 361, 362 (1921) Skid-
more v. Star Ins. Co. of America, 126 W Va. 307, 27 S.E. 2d 845, 850
(1943)
" I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) sec. 75.
9 GEORGIA CIVm CODE (1933) sec. 38-202.
"OHogan v Hogan, 196 Ga. 822, 28 S.E. 2d 74 (1943)
" Adams v. Elseffer, 132 Mich. 100, 92 N.W 772, 773 (1902),
Meador v. Hotel Grover, 193 Miss. 392, 9 So. 2d 782, 786 (1942), Hor-
ton v Tyree, 104 WVa. 238, 139 S.E. 737, 740 (1927).
'Fahey v. Crotty, 63 Mich. 383, 29 N.W 876 (1886), Haley v.
Walker, 223 Mo. App. 183, 12 S.W 2d 759 (1928) Coruth v. Jones,
77 Vt. 441, 60 Atl. 814 (1905)
"Sipple v. Kehr, 176 Ky 698, 197 S.W 391 (1917).
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the plaintiff was noted for quarrelsomeness is generally admissible
where an answer of son assault demesne is filed because it
" has an important bearing in determining
whether or not the defendant, under his plea of self de-
fense was justified in striking the first blow, which he
confessed having done, for it is a material factor in de-
termining whether the defendant made the assault in fear
and under a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was about
to attack him."'
The more liberal rule allows the defendant to show his good
reputation for peace and quet. So held the Indiana court in 1943
when it stated that "We can conceive of no reason why evidence
which is held to be a fact in issue in a criminal case should be ex-
cluded in a civil case where the same fact is in issue."' The Ken-
tucky court at the present time allows the introduction of the char-
acter of either party in an action for assault and battery where there
is a question as to the aggressor,"' as set out in the case of Bartlett
v. Vanover "
It is believed that character evidence should not be admitted
unless it will tend to shed light on the controversy in question. To
allow the introduction of such matter in cases involving fraud or
moral turpitude would be tantamount to giving more weight to
prejudicial than to probative evidence. In cases of assault and
battery where self defense is pleaded, the defendant should be per-
mitted to introduce and show to the jury the character of the plain-
tiff if he knew of such reputation prior to the alleged assault. Here
there would be probative value attached to the evidence to show
the probability that the plaintiff, from Ins prior reputation for
belligerence might attack the defendant, and that the defendant
might reasonably expect an assault by the plaintiff. Finally, where
there is a question as to the aggressor, the character of both parties
-regardless of prior knowledge-is of such probative value as to
outweigh any prejudice incident to the admission of such testimony
GmnEs J. MCCARTHY
Id. at 701, 197 S.W at 392.
'Niemeyer v McCarty, 221 Ind. 688, 51 N.E. 2d 365, 369-370
(1943)
'Brown v. Simpson, 293 Ky. 755, 170 S.W 2d 345 (1943)
Brown v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S.W 2d 1 (1943)
" 260 Ky. 839, 86 S.W 2d 1020 (1935).
